We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as ''pseudo'' targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be more pronounced). We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. In sum, we are unable to eliminate other plausible explanations for the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
P rior research compares discretionary accrual proxies for firms that just beat and just miss earnings benchmarks to investigate whether firms use discretionary accruals to beat earnings benchmarks (e.g., Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) . One disadvantage of studies that focus solely on comparisons centered on earnings benchmarks, however, is that these comparisons may not adequately control for the possibility of a systematic association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance. In particular, it is difficult to interpret a positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and the likelihood of beating an earnings benchmark if they also represent firm performance.
1 This study investigates the competing explanations for the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firms' propensity to beat earnings benchmarks.
In our first analysis, we use probit regressions to test whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit, earnings increase, and analysts' forecast benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analysts-based unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as ''pseudo'' targets. We compare firm-year observations across adjacent profit ''bins'' and examine the association between discretionary accrual measures and the probability that a firm reports a higher profit (i.e., resides in the next higher bin). We conduct similar analyses across the distributions of earnings changes and analysts-based unexpected earnings. We use total accruals, deferred tax expense, modified Jones (1991) model abnormal accruals, and forward-looking model abnormal accruals as alternative discretionary accrual proxies. Ex ante, if the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the actual earnings benchmarks are solely attributable to earnings management to beat the benchmarks, then one would expect significant positive associations between the discretionary accrual proxies and beating these pseudo targets by chance in no more than 10 percent of these comparisons where incentives to beat the pseudo targets should not exist.
2
In our second analysis, we test whether the association between discretionary accrual proxies and reporting higher profits becomes more pronounced around the actual profit benchmarks. We conduct similar analyses for the actual earnings increase and analysts' forecast benchmarks. It is possible that there is an underlying significant positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance (or, alternatively that firms manage earnings throughout the earnings distribution), but the association intensifies around earnings benchmarks where earnings management incentives are stronger. Evidence of an increased association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance around the actual benchmarks would be consistent with firms using discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We test whether the positive association between discretionary accrual measures and beating each actual benchmark is significantly larger than (1) the average association between the discretionary accrual measures and beating the pseudo targets and (2) the association between discretionary accruals and beating each pseudo target.
We find significant positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the actual profit benchmark. However, results suggest that these positive associations
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Results from our second analysis indicate that the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and reporting higher earnings intensify around the actual profit benchmark. We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. It is possible that firms manage both cash flows and discretionary accruals around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) . Alternatively, as suggested in Dechow et al. (2003) , managers and employees may simply work harder around earnings benchmarks, which could explain, in part or in aggregate, the larger associations around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. In sum, we are unable to eliminate other plausible explanations for the larger positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.
For the actual analysts' forecast benchmark, we find a significant positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the benchmark. In contrast to the pseudo profit and earnings change analyses, we find few positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo unexpected earnings targets (i.e., no more than expected by chance). In addition, we find no association between changes in cash flows and beating the actual analysts' forecast benchmark. Thus, we are able to draw stronger conclusions regarding earnings management around the analysts' forecast benchmark.
This study makes several contributions. We demonstrate that the positive associations between discretionary accrual measures and reporting higher earnings and more positive earnings changes extend to a significantly larger number of pseudo targets than expected by chance. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings. We draw two conclusions from this evidence. First, the underlying associations between firm performance and discretionary accrual measures are less problematic for tests of earnings management related to analysts-based unexpected earnings. Second, demonstrating positive associations between a specific discretionary accrual measure and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks is not sufficient to conclude that the discretionary accrual measure detects earnings management to beat these benchmarks. Among other implications, this evidence suggests in which settings the association between discretionary accruals and performance may be problematic.
We develop an additional analysis that specifically accounts for the systematic associations between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results from this analysis suggest that the associations between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes intensify around the actual profit and earnings increase benchmarks where earnings management incentives may be stronger. However, similar patterns exist for cash flows around these benchmarks. Thus, we are unable to conclude that earnings management explains the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.
One advantage of our analysis relative to performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005 ) is that it does not require specifying the exact nature of the correlation between discretionary accruals and performance-i.e., it does not require specifying a metric to match upon (e.g., ROA). Relative to performance-matching, our analysis may result in more powerful tests of earnings management around earnings benchmarks as it does not introduce ''noise'' in the tests via the matching process. Accordingly, this method may reduce the likelihood of falsely accepting the null hypothesis of no earnings management due to low power tests.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II presents our research method. Section III describes the sample selection, and Section IV presents descriptive statistics and results. Section V describes supplemental analyses, and Section VI concludes.
II. RESEARCH METHOD
One disadvantage of studies that focus solely on comparisons around earnings benchmarks is that they may not adequately allow for the possibility of a systematic association between discretionary accrual measures and firm performance irrespective of a firm's earnings management activities. Indeed, one of the central criticisms associated with using discretionary accrual proxies to test for earnings management is that the proxies may be capturing nondiscretionary accruals (i.e., differences in firm performance; see Dechow et al. 1995; Guay et al. 1996; Kasznik 1999; McNichols 2000) . This study provides two analyses that may be useful in disentangling the competing explanations for the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. The following paragraphs describe these analyses for the profit benchmark. Subsequent paragraphs discuss analyses for the earnings increase and analysts' forecast benchmarks.
Profit Benchmark Analyses
We test whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual measures (i.e., total accruals, deferred tax expense, modified Jones model abnormal accruals, and forwardlooking model abnormal accruals) and beating the profit benchmark hold for comparisons of groups segregated based on pseudo profit targets.
3 Specifically, we compare firm-years across adjacent profit ''bins'' and examine the association between various discretionary accrual measures and the probability that a firm reports higher profits (i.e., resides in the next higher bin). Dechow et al. (1995) , Kasznik (1999) , and Dechow et al. (2003) , among others, suggest that commonly used discretionary accrual proxies (e.g., modified Jones model abnormal accruals and forward-looking model abnormal accruals) increase in earnings. Likewise, for various firms one might anticipate a positive association between deferred tax expense and firm performance. For example, firms with depreciable assets (e.g., manufacturing firms) whose operations are not contracting are likely to maintain a constant level of or increase their depreciable assets relative to firms with poor performance. Ceteris paribus, new depreciable assets generate a more positive (or less negative) deferred tax balance because assets are depreciated more rapidly for tax compared to financial reporting purposes. Thus, it is plausible that there may be a positive association between deferred tax expense and firm performance. Figure 1 illustrates the comparisons across the actual profit benchmark and pseudo profit targets. To estimate the association between discretionary accrual proxies and beating 3 Prior studies use total accruals (Phillips et al. 2003) , deferred tax expense (Phillips et al. 2003 ), modified Jones model abnormal accruals (Payne and Robb 2000; Matsumoto 2002; Phillips et al. 2003) , and forward-looking model accruals (Dechow et al 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) to investigate earnings management around earnings benchmarks. 4 Other book-tax differences may lead to a less positive (or more negative) deferred tax balance (e.g., warranty expense). Thus, it is an empirical question whether there is a positive association between deferred tax expense and firm performance.
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FIGURE 1 Pseudo Target and Actual Profit Benchmark Comparisons
the actual profit benchmark, we compare discretionary accrual proxies for firms that justbeat and just-miss the profit benchmark. In particular, we analyze the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and the firm's propensity to reside in the bin to the right of the profit benchmark. For the pseudo profit targets, we compare discretionary accrual proxies for firms that just-beat and just-miss the pseudo profit targets-i.e., we analyze the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and the firm's propensity to reside in the bin to the right of the pseudo profit targets.
We estimate the following probit model to test whether alternative discretionary accrual measures are positively associated with the probability that a firm meets or beats (1) the actual profit benchmark and (2) pseudo profit targets:
where:
We define E it as firm i's net income in year t (annual Compustat data item #172) divided by the market value of equity at the end of year tϪ1 (annual Compustat data item #25 ϫ #199), and X as the profit target. X equals 0 for the actual profit benchmark;
5
DisAccruals it ϭ one of the following four alternative measures of firm i's discretionary accruals in year t: 5 We use net income after extraordinary items to be consistent with previous research investigating the propensity of firms to beat earnings benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) .
Results are similar when we estimate the analyses using net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #123).
• Total Accruals ϭ total accruals, scaled by total assets ( 
, where k is the slope coefficient from a regression of ⌬REC it on ⌬Sales it, (winsorized so that 0 Յ k Յ 1) Total Accruals itϪ1 equals total accruals from year tϪ1, scaled by total assets as of year tϪ2, and Gr Sales tϩ1 equals the change in sales from year t to tϩ1, scaled by year t sales. We estimate the forward-looking model cross-sectionally by year and industry for each two-digit SIC industry year with at least ten observations; Cash Flows it ϭ cash flows from continuing operations (annual Compustat data items #308 Ϫ #124), scaled by total assets as of the end of year tϪ1; ⌺ j Ind it ϭ 1 (0) if firm i is (is not) in industry j in year t, based on two-digit SIC codes; and ε it ϭ the error term.
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , we segregate firms into ''profit'' bins based on the firm's year t net income deflated by end of year tϪ1 market value of equity. We design the pseudo targets and profit bin widths to mitigate the potential that any given firmyear observation appears in multiple just-beat or just-miss comparison groups. Each justbeat and just-miss bin has a width of .01, and each firm-year observation appears once in
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7 Finally, we designate pseudo targets in .01 increments beginning at Ϫ.09 and ending at .10. Thus, we investigate 19 pseudo profit targets.
Consistent with prior studies investigating discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) , we deflate each discretionary accrual measure by lag total assets. We include cash flows as a control for performance (Phillips et al. 2003) or alternatively, to control for the effect that a firm's cash flow may have on the firm's need to manage earnings via discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (2003) estimate, based on a linear approximation of the earnings distribution, that 85 to 90 percent of firms just beat the profit benchmark without managing earnings. Probit analyses controlling for a firm's cash flows should provide more powerful tests of earnings management than univariate comparisons that do not control for the firm's need to manage earnings via discretionary accruals. Finally, we include two-digit SIC industry dummy variables in each probit regression to control for possible differences in the tendency to beat earnings targets across industries.
Ex ante, if the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit benchmark are solely attributable to earnings management to beat the benchmark, one would expect significant positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo profit targets by chance in no more than 10 percent of the comparisons across pseudo targets (i.e., where incentives to beat the targets should not exist). This expectation is based upon using a 10 percent significance level to reject the null hypothesis. More frequent significant positive associations would be consistent with (1) a positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance (i.e., irrespective of earnings management) and/or (2) firms managing earnings upward across the distribution of earnings. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish between earnings management versus merely an association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance.
Implicit in studies analyzing discretionary accruals around earnings benchmarks is the expectation that the relationship between firm performance and discretionary accruals shifts around benchmarks. Indeed, it is possible that there is an underlying significant positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance (or, alternatively that firms manage earnings throughout the earnings distribution), but the association intensifies around earnings benchmarks where earnings management incentives are stronger. Evidence of an increased association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance around the actual profit benchmark would be consistent with firms using discretionary accruals to beat the benchmark. Accordingly, we test whether the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and reporting higher earnings are larger around the profit benchmark. We estimate the following probit model: 
where Actual ϭ 1 for firm-year observations in the just-miss or just-beat bins around the actual profit benchmark, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Equation (1). We estimate two different specifications of Equation (2). First, we estimate Equation (2) to determine if the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit benchmark are significantly greater than the average association between the discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo targets (i.e., we compare the association between (1) DisAccruals and (2) beating the actual profit benchmark to the respective average association for beating the pseudo targets). We include the just-beat and just-miss bins for all pseudo targets and the just-beat and justmiss bins for the actual profit benchmark in one probit regression. The coefficient for Actual*DisAccruals represents the incremental difference in (1) the association between the discretionary accrual proxy and beating the actual profit benchmark and (2) the average association between the discretionary accrual proxy and beating the pseudo targets. A significant positive coefficient for Actual*DisAccruals would indicate that the association between the discretionary accrual proxy and reporting higher earnings becomes more pronounced around the actual profit benchmark, which would be consistent with earnings management to beat the profit benchmark.
We estimate Equation (2) a second time to determine if the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit benchmark is significantly greater than the associations between the discretionary accrual proxies and beating each pseudo target (i.e., we compare the associations between (1) DiscAccruals and (2) beating the actual profit benchmark to the respective associations for each pseudo target). We estimate Equation (2) once for each specific pseudo profit target. In these analyses, there are four bins included in each analysis. We include the just-miss and just-beat bins around the actual profit benchmark and the just-miss and just-beat bins around the pseudo profit target. Similar to above, a significant positive coefficient for Actual*DisAccruals would indicate that the association between the discretionary accrual proxy and reporting higher earnings becomes more pronounced around the actual benchmarks, which would be consistent with earnings management to beat the profit benchmark.
Earnings Increase Benchmark Analyses
We make three changes to Equations (1) and (2) to investigate the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the actual earnings increase benchmark and pseudo earnings change targets. First, we segregate firms into ''earnings change'' bins based on the firm's year t earnings change deflated by end of year tϪ2 market value of equity. Similar to the profit benchmark analyses, each just-beat and just-miss bin has a width of .01, and each firm-year observation appears once in a just-beat group and once in a just-miss group. We investigate 19 pseudo targets consisting of firms with deflated earnings changes between Ϫ.10 and .11. Second, we redefine EM it to equal 1 if X Յ ⌬E it Ͻ (X ϩ 0.01) and 0 if (X Ϫ 0.01) Յ ⌬E it Ͻ X. We define ⌬E it as the change in firm i's net income from year tϪ1 to t divided by the market value of equity at the end of year tϪ2, and X as the earnings change target. X equals 0 for the actual earnings increase benchmark. Third, we replace CashFlows in Equations (1) and (2) with ⌬CashFlows to control for performance (Phillips et al. 2003) . We define ⌬CashFlows as the change in firm i's cash flows from continuing
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Analysts' Forecast Benchmark Analyses
We make three modifications to Equations (1) and (2) for the analysts' forecast benchmark analyses. First, we assign firms to ''analysts-based unexpected earnings'' bins based on the firm's unexpected earnings per share (in cents). We define UE it (unexpected earnings) as firm i's year t actual earnings per share minus the single-most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement, both available from the Unadjusted I/B/E/S Detail History file. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999; Payne and Thomas 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) , we round UE it to the nearest penny. Each just-beat and just-miss bin has a width of .01, and each firm-year observation appears once in a just-beat group and once in a just-miss group. We investigate 19 pseudo targets in these analyses consisting of firms with unexpected earnings between negative ten cents per share and positive ten cents per share. Second, we redefine EM it to equal 1 if UE it equals X cents per share, and 0 if UE it equals X less one cent per share. We define X as the unexpected earnings target, and X equals 0 for the actual analysts' forecast benchmark. 8 Third, we replace CashFlows in Equations (1) and (2) with ⌬CashFlows in these analyses to control for performance (Phillips et al. 2003) .
We use the single-most recent analyst forecast issued prior to the earnings announcement from the Unadjusted I/B/E/S Detail History file as our forecast benchmark. O'Brien (1988) and Brown (1991) suggest that the single-most recent analyst forecast is more accurate in predicting actual earnings than the consensus mean forecast. Likewise, Brown and Kim (1991) find that the single-most recent analyst forecast more accurately reflects the market's earnings expectation than the consensus mean forecast. Assuming that firms intend to meet or beat market expectations, using a more current forecast proxy should provide a more powerful test of whether firms use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecasts. This may be especially important since recent research suggests that firms ''walk down'' analyst forecasts during the sample period (Richardson et al. 2004 ).
III. SAMPLE SELECTION
We consider four discretionary accrual measures in our tests, including total accruals, deferred tax expense, modified Jones model abnormal accruals, and forward-looking model abnormal accruals. To facilitate a consistent measure of deferred tax expense across our sample period, we restrict the sample to post-SFAS No. 109 deferred tax expense measures (i.e., firm-years from 1994-2002). We exclude firms not incorporated in the U.S., mutual funds (SIC code 6726), trusts (SIC code 6792), REITS (SIC code 6798), limited partnerships (SIC code 6799), and other flow-through entities (SIC code 6795) because these firms are either primarily subject to taxation outside the U.S. or do not account for income tax expense. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6099) as regulated firms likely face different earnings management incentives than nonregulated firms. To mitigate the effect of extreme observations, we delete firm-years with a deferred tax expense in the top or bottom one percentile in each comparison or with a scaled total accrual, modified Jones model abnormal accruals, or forward-looking model abnormal accruals greater than 100 percent (in absolute value) of lagged total assets (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Dechow et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2003) . Finally, each firm-year observation must have sufficient information available to calculate the requisite variables in the probit analysis. Table 1 , Panel A presents the sample size for each profit bin and the mean values of each discretionary accrual measure. In each row, we test whether the mean values of the discretionary accrual measures for that particular profit bin is significantly higher (i.e., more positive or less negative) than the mean values of the discretionary accrual measures in the preceding row. We denote significant differences (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) with bold text and identify the ''actual'' just-beat and just-miss groups with ''boxed'' text. To provide additional evidence regarding the potential positive correlation between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance, the last row of Panel A reports the correlation between the mean values of discretionary accrual measures for each bin and the bin number, which ranges from 1 (the most negative bin) to 21 (the most positive bin). and Gr Sales tϩ1 ). 1,180 observations reside in the actual just-beat bin (i.e., .00 Յ E it Ͻ .01) and 683 reside in the actual just-miss bin (i.e., Ϫ.01 Յ E it Ͻ .00) when Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, or Modified Jones Dis. Accruals proxies for discretionary accruals. 963 observations reside in the actual just-beat bin and 548 reside in the actual just-miss bin when Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals proxies for discretionary accruals. Similar to prior research, when we graph the frequency of bin observations for the profit benchmark sample, we observe a ''kink'' in the distributions to the left of the zero profit bin.
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS
Profit Benchmark Analyses
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals are significantly larger (i.e., more positive or less negative at p Յ .10, onetailed test) in the .00 Յ E it Ͻ .01 bin (i.e., the just-beat bin) relative to the Ϫ.01 Յ E it Ͻ .00 bin (i.e., the just-miss bin).
9 Nonetheless, similar results hold for five of the 19 other comparisons for Total Accruals, seven of the 19 other comparisons for Deferred Tax Expense, and four of the other 19 comparisons for Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals (p Յ .10, onetailed test). These univariate comparisons suggest that the positive associations between discretionary accrual measures and earnings extend to other earnings bins not centered on the zero profit benchmark. We also note, as might be expected, that CashFlows increases in earnings. In ten of 20 comparisons, the mean value of CashFlows is statistically larger (more positive or less negative at p Յ .10) than its value in the preceding bin. 9 Prior research (Dechow et al. 2000 (Dechow et al. , 2003 Phillips et al. 2003 
Independent Variables
DisAccruals is defined as: We construct probability levels for all statistical tests in Panels A, C, and D using one-tailed tests. Panels A and C highlight the ''actual'' just-beat and just-miss groups for profit benchmark with ''boxed'' text. Bold text in Panel A indicates that the mean discretionary accruals value is significantly larger than the mean value of the preceding group (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). Bold text in Panel B highlights the significant Pearson correlation ((p Յ .10, two-tailed test). Bold text in Panel C highlights significant coefficient for discretionary accruals measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). a The number to the left of the slash '' / '' identifies the sample size for the analyses when Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Modified Jones Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. The number to the right of the slash '' / '' is the sample size for the analyses when Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. b In the last two rows of Panel C we report (1) the number of significant positive coefficients (k) for each discretionary accrual measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) and (2) the probability of ''drawing'' k or more significant positive coefficients assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance. c or d in Panel C indicate that the coefficient from the probit regression using the sample restricted to just-beat and just-miss firms around the actual benchmark is significantly larger than the estimated coefficient for this specific pseudo target at p Յ .05 (one-tailed test) or p Յ .10 (one-tailed test), respectively. 
where ⌬Sales it equals the change in the firm's sales (annual Compustat data item #12) from year tϪ1 to year t, ⌬REC it equals the change in accounts receivable (annual Compustat data item #302) from year tϪ1 to year t, and PPE equals the firm's gross property, plant, and equipment (annual Compustat data item #7). We estimate the Modified Jones model cross-sectionally by year and industry years for each two-digit SIC industry year with at least ten observations. We scale all variables by total assets at the end of year tϪ1; Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals ϭ abnormal accruals computed using the forward-looking model (Dechow et al. 2003) . We calculate Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals as the difference between Total Accruals and forward-looking normal accruals. Forward-looking model normal accruals are estimated as:
, where k is the slope coefficient from a regression of ⌬REC it on ⌬Sales it , Total Accruals itϪ1 equals total accruals from year tϪ1, scaled by total assets as of year tϪ2, and Gr Sales tϩ1 equals the change in sales from year t to tϩ1, scaled by year t sales. We estimate the forward-looking model cross-sectionally by year and industry for each two-digit SIC industry year with at least ten observations; CashFlows ϭ cash flows from operations (annual Compustat data items #308 Ϫ #124), scaled by total assets as of the end of year tϪ1;
EM it ϭ 1 if X Յ E it Ͻ (X ϩ 0.01) and 0 if (X Ϫ 0.01) Յ E it Ͻ X. X is the profit target. X equals 0 for the actual profit benchmark; ⌺ j Ind it ϭ 1 (0) if firm i is (is not) in industry j in year t, based on two-digit SIC codes; and Actual ϭ 1 for firm-year observations in the just-miss or just-beat bins around the actual benchmarks, and 0 otherwise.
The last row of ) (p Յ .10, twotailed test). In sum, univariate analyses suggest that the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and reporting higher earnings may not be unique to comparisons centered on the profit benchmark. Targets  Table 1 , Panel C reports the results of the pseudo target and actual benchmark analyses. 10 The fourth through seventh columns present the coefficients for the alternative discretionary accrual measures. In the last column we present the coefficients for Cash Flows from the regression including Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals as the discretionary accrual proxy. The pattern of significant coefficients for Cash Flows is similar when we use Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, or Modified Jones Dis. Accruals as the discretionary accrual proxy. Each row represents the results for estimating Equation (1) for a different just-beat and just-miss sample. We highlight positive and significant coefficients (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) with bold text and identify the actual just-beat and just-miss groups with boxed text. In the last two rows we tally the number of significant positive coefficients (k) for the pseudo target regressions for each discretionary accrual measure (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) and present the probability of ''drawing'' k or more significant positive coefficients assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance.
Comparisons across Pseudo
We find in Panel C of Table 1 that Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals are each positively associated with the probability of beating the actual profit benchmark (p Յ .01, one-tailed test). Results suggest, however, that the significant positive associations between these discretionary accrual proxies and firm profits exist for more than the expected number of comparisons of adjacent bins segregated based on pseudo profit targets. Of the 19 comparisons across adjacent bins segregated based on pseudo profit targets, we find a significant positive association (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) between beating the pseudo target and (1) Total Accruals in 12 comparisons (63 percent), (2) Deferred Tax Expense in six comparisons (32 percent), (3) Modified Jones Dis. Accruals in seven comparisons (37 percent), and (4) Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals in ten comparisons (52 percent). Assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance, the frequency of positive significant associations for each discretionary accrual measure is significantly higher than expected (p Յ .01, one tailed test). Accordingly, it is difficult to distinguish whether the associations between Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals and beating the actual profit benchmark are attributable to earnings management or the associations between these discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance. Finally, as might be expected, Panel C indicates that CashFlows is positively related to beating the actual profit benchmark and is also positively associated with beating ten of the 19 pseudo profit targets (p Յ .10, one tailed test).
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Tests for Shifts in the Association between Discretionary Accrual Measures and Firm Performance around the Profit Benchmark
We estimate Equation (2) to test whether the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance increase around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be stronger). In Table 1 , Panel C, we identify with superscripts c and d those regression coefficients from the pseudo target analyses that are significantly smaller (p Յ .05 and p Յ .10, one-tailed test, respectively) than the estimated coefficient from the actual profit benchmark (i.e., significantly smaller than the coefficients highlighted in boxed text).
In Table 1 , Panel D, we report the results when we compare the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the actual profit benchmark to the average association between the discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo targets. Comparing the coefficients for DisAccruals estimated for the actual benchmark and pseudo targets via Actual*DisAccruals in Equation (2) is similar to comparing the marginal effects of the discretionary accrual measures for the actual benchmark and pseudo targets. In particular, comparisons of the marginal effects for DisAccruals for the actual benchmarks and pseudo targets generate the same sign and statistical significance as Actual*DisAccruals. Likewise, the ratio of one coefficient (e.g., DisAccruals) to another (e.g., CashFlows) is similar in magnitude to the ratio of their marginal effects, which allows one to compare the relative marginal effects of each variable.
Consistent with the relationship between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance increasing around the profit benchmark, In addition, Table 1 , Panel C reports that the coefficients for Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals estimated around the actual profit benchmark are significantly larger than the majority of the estimated coefficients from the pseudo profit target comparisons. In particular, the estimated coefficients around the profit benchmark are significantly larger than 19 of the 19 coefficients for Total Accruals for the pseudo targets, 16 of the 19 coefficients for Deferred Tax Expense for the pseudo targets, and 17 of the 19 coefficients for Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals for the pseudo targets (p Ͻ .10, one-tailed test). These frequencies are significantly higher than expected (p ϭ .00, one-tailed test) assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood that the actual benchmark coefficient is significantly larger than a pseudo target coefficient by chance. We find that the estimated coefficient for Modified Jones Dis. Accruals for the profit benchmark is significantly larger (p Ͻ .10, one-tailed test) than four of the 19 coefficients for Modified Jones Dis. Accruals for the pseudo targets.
In sum, results suggest that the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firm profits intensify around the actual profit benchmark. These findings are consistent with the earnings management hypothesis-i.e., the association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance shifts in those settings where firms have greater incentives to manage earnings. However, the associations between CashFlows and firm profits generally also increase around the actual profit benchmark. Specifically, Table 1 , Panel D reports that the association between CashFlows and beating the actual profit benchmark is significantly larger (p Յ .05, one-tailed test) than the average association between CashFlows and beating the pseudo profit targets in three of the four specifications of Equation (2). Likewise, Table 1, Panel C indicates that the coefficient for CashFlows from the regression estimated around the actual profit benchmark is significantly larger than most of the coefficients for CashFlows for the pseudo earnings targets.
There are at least three possible explanations for the increased association between CashFlows and earnings around the actual profit benchmark. First, it is possible that firms manage both cash flows and discretionary accruals around the profit benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) . Indeed, evidence reported by Roychowdhury (2003) suggests that firms manage cash flows from operations to avoid reporting losses. Second, it is possible that cash flows from operations better represent firm performance around the profit benchmark. For example, the association between cash flows from operations and net income may increase around the profit benchmark if firms are less likely to report extraordinary items around the profit benchmark. We examined the distribution of extraordinary items for our sample and note that extraordinary items are more pronounced at the tails of the earnings distributions. In sensitivity analysis, we re-estimated our probit regressions after limiting the sample to firms that do not report extraordinary items. Results are similar to those reported in Table 1 , Panels C and D for our discretionary accrual measures. In addition, the coefficients for CashFlows remain more pronounced around the profit benchmark. Third, as suggested in Dechow et al. (2003) , it is possible that managers and employees may simply work harder around earnings benchmarks. If this conjecture is descriptive, then it could, in part or in aggregate, explain the unique association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude with confidence that earnings management explains this association. Table 2 , Panels A and B, report univariate analyses for the earnings increase benchmark. In each row of Panel A, we test whether the mean values of the discretionary accrual measures for that particular earnings change bin is significantly higher (i.e., more positive or less negative) than the mean values of the discretionary accrual measures in the preceding row. Panel A indicates that both Total Accruals and Deferred Tax Expense are significantly larger (i.e., more positive or less negative at p Յ .10, one-tailed test) in the .00 Յ ⌬E it Ͻ .01 bin (i.e., the actual just-beat bin) relative to the Ϫ.01 Յ ⌬E it Ͻ .00 bin (i.e., the actual just-miss bin).
Earnings Increase Benchmark Analyses
11 However, these same relations hold for seven of the 19 other comparisons for Total Accruals and three of the 19 other comparisons for Deferred Tax Expense (p Յ .10, one-tailed test).
The last row of We construct probability levels for all statistical tests in Panels A, C, and D using one-tailed tests. Panels A and C highlight the ''actual'' just-beat and just-miss groups for profit benchmark with ''boxed'' text. Bold text in Panel A indicates that the mean discretionary accruals value is significantly larger than the mean value of the preceding group (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). Bold text in Panel B highlights the significant Pearson correlation ((p Յ .10, two-tailed test). Bold text in Panel C highlights significant coefficient for discretionary accruals measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). a The number to the left of the slash '' / '' identifies the sample size for the analyses when Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Modified Jones Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. The number to the right of the slash '' / '' is the sample size for the analyses when Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. b In the last two rows of Panel C we report (1) the number of significant positive coefficients (k) for each discretionary accrual measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) and (2) the probability of ''drawing'' k or more significant positive coefficients assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance. c and d in Panel C indicate that the coefficient from the probit regression using the sample restricted to just-beat and just-miss firms around the actual benchmark is significantly larger than the estimated coefficient for this specific pseudo target at p Յ .05 (one-tailed test) and p Յ .10 (one-tailed test), respectively. Variable Definitions:
⌬E it ϭ the change in net income (annual Compustat data item #172) from year tϪ1 to year t scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year tϪ2 (annual Compustat data item #25 ϫ #199); EM it ϭ 1 if X Յ ⌬E it Ͻ (X ϩ 0.01) and 0 if (X Ϫ 0.01) Յ ⌬E it Ͻ X. X is the earnings change target. X equals 0 for the actual earnings increase benchmark; and ⌬CashFlows ϭ the change in Cash Flows from year tϪ1 to year t, scaled by total assets as of the end of year tϪ1; Table 1 provides the definitions for all other variables.
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discretionary accrual proxies and reporting more positive earnings changes may not be unique to comparisons centered on the earnings increase benchmark. Targets  Table 2 , Panel C reports the results of the pseudo target and actual benchmark analyses.
Comparisons across Pseudo
12 Each row represents the results for estimating Equation (1) for a different just-beat and just-miss sample. We highlight positive and significant coefficients (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) with bold text and identify the actual just-beat and just-miss groups with boxed text. In the last two rows we tally the number of significant positive coefficients (k) for the pseudo target regressions for each discretionary accrual measure (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) and present the probability of ''drawing'' k or more significant positive coefficients assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance. Panel C reports significant positive associations between (1) Results for the pseudo earnings change target analysis are similar to those for the pseudo profit target analysis, albeit less pronounced. Of the 19 comparisons across adjacent earnings change bins, segregated based on pseudo earnings change targets, we find a significant positive association (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) between beating the pseudo target and (1) Total Accruals in nine comparisons (47 percent), (2) Deferred Tax Expense in five comparisons (26 percent), (3) Modified Jones Dis. Accruals in four comparisons (21 percent), and (4) Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals in eight comparisons (42 percent). These frequencies of significant positive coefficients are significantly higher than expected by chance at p ϭ .00, p ϭ .04, and p ϭ .00 (one-tailed test) for Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals, respectively, and at p ϭ .12 (one-tailed test) for Modified Jones Dis. Accruals. Thus, similar to the profit benchmark analysis, it is difficult to distinguish whether the associations between Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and FwdLook Dis. Accruals and beating the earnings increase benchmark are attributable to earnings management or the associations between these discretionary accruals proxies and earnings changes. Finally, Table 2, Panel C indicates that ⌬CashFlows is positively related to beating the earnings increase benchmark and nine of 19 pseudo earnings change targets (p Յ .10, one-tailed test).
Tests for Shifts in the Association between Discretionary Accrual Measures and Firm Performance around the Earnings Increase Benchmark
We estimate Equation (2) to test whether the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance increase around the actual earnings increase benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be stronger). In Table 2 , Panel C, we identify with superscripts ''c'' and ''d'' those regression coefficients from the pseudo target analyses that are significantly smaller (p Յ .05 and p Յ .10, one-tailed test, respectively) than the estimated coefficient from the actual earnings increase benchmark (i.e., significantly smaller than the coefficients highlighted in boxed text). In Table 2 , Panel D, we report the results when we compare the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating the actual earnings increase benchmark to the average association between the discretionary accrual proxies and beating the pseudo targets. Consistent with the relationship between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance becoming more pronounced around the earnings increase benchmark, Table 2 , Panel D reports that the regression coefficients for Total Accruals and Deferred Tax Expense estimated around the actual earnings increase benchmark are significantly larger (p ϭ .00 and .03, respectively, one-tailed test) than the average association between the respective discretionary accrual measures and beating the pseudo earnings change targets. The difference between the coefficient for Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals estimated around the earnings increase benchmark and the average association between Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals and beating the pseudo earnings change targets is positive as expected but not statistically significant (p ϭ .13, one-tailed test). Table 2 , Panel C reports that the coefficients for Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals from the regressions estimated around the actual earnings increase benchmark are significantly larger than many of the estimated coefficients from the pseudo profit target comparisons. In particular, the estimated coefficients around the earnings increase benchmark are significantly larger than 18 of the 19 coefficients for Total Accruals for the pseudo targets, 12 of the 19 coefficients for Deferred Tax Expense for the pseudo targets, and eight of the 19 coefficients for Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals for the pseudo targets (p Ͻ .10, one-tailed test). These frequencies are significantly higher than expected (p ϭ .00, one-tailed test) assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood that the actual benchmark coefficient is significantly larger than a pseudo target coefficient by chance.
The associations between ⌬CashFlows and reporting more positive earnings changes generally also increase around the actual earnings increase benchmark. Specifically, Table  2 , Panel D reports that the association between ⌬CashFlows and beating the actual earnings increase benchmark is significantly larger (p Յ ϭ.00, one-tailed test) than the average association between ⌬CashFlows and beating the pseudo earnings change targets in all four specifications of Equation (2). Likewise, Table 2 , Panel C indicates that the estimated coefficient for ⌬CashFlows around the actual earnings increase benchmark is significantly larger than each of the coefficients for ⌬CashFlows for the pseudo earnings change targets. As discussed above, these results are consistent with firms managing both cash flows and discretionary accruals around the earnings increase benchmark, or managers and employees working harder around the earnings increase benchmark. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude with confidence that earnings management explains the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the earnings increase benchmark. Table 3 , Panels A and B report the univariate analyses for the analysts' forecast benchmark. Panel A indicates that Total Accruals, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals are significantly larger (more positive or less negative) in the actual just-beat bin relative to the actual just-miss bin.
Analysts' Forecast Benchmark Analyses
13 These same relations hold for only one of the 19 other comparisons for Modified Jones Dis. Accruals and none of the 19 other comparisons for Total Accruals and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). Unlike the results for the profit and earnings increase benchmark analyses, there appears to be little positive 13 Using the last mean consensus analyst forecast from the Adjusted I / B / E / S Summary file as the analysts' forecast benchmark, prior research (Dechow et al. 2000; Phillips et al. 2003) reports no significant differences in univariate comparisons of Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals for just-beat and just-miss firms around the actual analysts' forecast benchmark. We find similar results to prior research when we use the last mean consensus analyst forecast from the Adjusted I / B / E / S Summary file as the analysts' forecast benchmark. 
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Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals We construct probability levels for all statistical tests in Panels A, C, and D using one-tailed tests. Panels A and C highlight the actual just-beat and just-miss groups for profit benchmark with ''boxed text.'' Bold text in Panel A indicates that the mean discretionary accruals value is significantly larger than the mean value of the preceding group (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). Bold text in Panel B highlights the significant Pearson correlation ((p Յ .10, two-tailed test) . Bold text in Panel C highlights significant coefficient for discretionary accruals measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test). a The number to the left of the slash '' / '' identifies the sample size for the analyses when Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, and Modified Jones Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. The number to the right of the slash '' / '' is the sample size for the analyses when Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. b In the last two rows of Panel C we report (1) the number of significant positive coefficients (k) for each discretionary accrual measures (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) and (2) the probability of ''drawing'' k or more significant positive coefficients assuming a binomial distribution and 10 percent likelihood of drawing a significant positive coefficient by chance. c or d in Panel C indicate that the coefficient from the probit regression using the sample restricted to just-beat and just-miss firms around the actual benchmark is significantly larger than the estimated coefficient for this specific pseudo target at p Յ .05 (one-tailed test) or p Յ .10 (one-tailed test), respectively. Variable Definitions: UE it ϭ the unexpected earnings (actual earnings per share minus the single-most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement both available from the Unadjusted I / B / E / S Detail History file); and EM it ϭ 1 if UE it equals X cents per share and 0 if UE it equals X less one cent per share. We define UE it as firm i's year t actual earnings per share minus the singlemost recent analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement both reported from the Unadjusted I / B / E / S Detail History file. We round UE it to the nearest penny. We define X as the unexpected earnings target, and X equals zero for the actual analysts' forecast benchmark. Targets  Table 3 , Panel C reports a significant positive association between (1) beating the actual analysts' forecast benchmark and (2) Total Accruals, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, .04, and .04, respectively, .
؊0.3425
Panel C: Probit Analyses across Adjacent Unexpected Earnings Groups
EM it ϭ ␣ ϩ ␤ 1 DisAccruals it ϩ ␤ 2 ⌬CashFlows it ϩ ␤ j ⌺ j Ind it ϩ ε it (1)
Comparisons across Pseudo
14 We find a positive but insignificant association for Deferred Tax Expense (p ϭ .29, one-tailed test). In addition, we find few positive associations between the discretionary accrual measures and beating the pseudo analysts-based unexpected earnings targets. Specifically, the frequency of significant positive coefficients for each discretionary accrual measures is not significantly different from what would be expected by chance. Finally, Panel C indicates that ⌬CashFlows is not significantly associated with beating the analysts' forecast benchmark and is only significantly positively related to beating one of the 19 pseudo unexpected earnings targets (p Յ .10, one-tailed test).
15
Tests for Shifts in the Association between Discretionary Accrual Measures and Firm Performance around the Analysts' Forecast Benchmark
Because we find little evidence of a positive association between discretionary accrual measures and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings, the comparisons of the coefficients for Total Accruals, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and FwdLook Dis. Accruals across the actual analysts' forecast benchmark and pseudo targets are less informative. Nonetheless, Table 3 , Panel D reports that the coefficients for Total Accruals, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals estimated around the actual analysts' forecast benchmark are significantly larger (p ϭ .07, .03, and .04, respectively, one-tailed test) than the average association between the respective discretionary accrual measures and beating the pseudo analysts' forecast targets. Likewise, Panel C reports that the coefficients for Total Accruals, Modified Jones Dis. Accruals, and Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals estimated around the actual analysts' forecast benchmark are significantly larger than many of the estimated coefficients from the pseudo profit target comparisons. Finally, unlike the profit and earnings increase benchmark analyses, we find no associations between ⌬CashFlows and beating the analysts' forecast benchmark. Accordingly, we are able to draw stronger conclusions regarding earnings management around the analysts' forecast benchmark. 14 Phillips et al. (2003) uses the last mean consensus analyst forecast from the Adjusted I / B / E / S Summary file as the analysts' forecast benchmark. When we use the last mean consensus analyst forecast from the Adjusted I / B / E / S Summary file, probit results for the actual analysts' forecast benchmark are similar to those reported in Phillips et al. (2003) . 15 In sensitivity analysis, we compared the price-to-earnings (PE) multiples and book-to-market (BM) ratios of firms that just beat the analysts' forecast benchmark to other sample firms to determine if the just-beat firms are more likely to represent growth firms. We find no significant difference in PE multiples or book-to-market ratios for firms that just beat the analysts' forecast benchmark (i.e., UE ϭ .00) compared to those firms that just miss the benchmark (UE ϭ Ϫ.01).
comparisons based on firm profits directly relate to current ROA, we match firms on lagged ROA and two-digit SIC industry for the profit target analyses. 16 Kothari et al. (2005) find that matching on current or lagged ROA results in better-specified tests than discretionary accrual measures that are not performance-matched, although matching on current ROA generally performs better than lagged ROA matching. We then re-estimate our probit models using discretionary accrual measures adjusted by the matched firm's discretionary accruals. Table 4 presents the results including Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals as the discretionary accrual proxy in the profit, earnings increase, and analysts' forecast benchmark analyses. Results are generally much weaker than those reported in Panel C of Tables 1, 2, and 3. In particular, we find that Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals is no longer significantly associated with beating the actual profit or analysts' forecast benchmark. Conclusions are similar when we use Total Accruals, Deferred Tax Expense, or Modified Jones Dis. Accruals to proxy for discretionary accruals-i.e., we find little evidence of significant positive associations between performance-matched discretionary accrual proxies and beating the profit or analysts' forecast benchmark.
There are two plausible explanations for the considerably weaker results for performance-matched discretionary accruals: (1) performance-matching reduces the power of statistical tests of earnings management around earnings benchmarks, and (2) the previous associations we find between discretionary accrual measures and beating the profit and analysts' forecast benchmarks are attributable to an underlying association between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance that is unrelated to earnings management. Our previous analyses indicate that discretionary accrual proxies are not systematically associated with reporting more positive analysts-based unexpected earnings. On balance, therefore, we interpret explanation (1) to be more descriptive for the performance-matching results for the analysts' forecast benchmark. Given our prior evidence of a systematic positive association between discretionary accrual proxies and reporting higher earnings, we are unable to distinguish explanations (1) and (2) for the performance-matching results for the profit benchmark.
Alternative Explanations for the Profit and Earnings Change Kinks
Recent studies provide alternative explanations (i.e., besides earnings management) for the kinks in the earnings and earnings changes distributions around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. Dechow et al. (2003) and Durtschi and Easton (2005) demonstrate that the kinks in the earnings and earnings change distributions disappear when earnings and earnings changes are deflated by shares outstanding instead of market value. In contrast, Beaver et al. (2003) contend that much of the kink in the earnings and earnings changes distributions are attributable to factors not related to earnings management, such as the asymmetric treatment of income taxes and special items for loss firms versus profitable firms.
We conduct additional analyses to control for the effects that the asymmetric treatment of income taxes and special items for loss and profits may have on our inferences. Specifically, we re-estimate the profit, earnings increase, and analysts' forecast benchmark analyses after including two additional control variables, special items deflated by lagged assets and current tax expense deflated by lagged assets. Results are similar to those presented in the tables. In sum, we find no evidence that differences in the asymmetric treatment of a For analysts-based unexpected earnings bins, just-beat firms include firms for which unexpected earnings equal the lower bound value. b For analysts-based unexpected earnings bins, just-miss firms include firms for which unexpected earnings equal the lower bound value. We construct probability levels for all coefficients using a one-tailed test. We highlight the actual just-beat and just-miss groups for a specific earnings benchmark with ''boxed text'' and significant positive coefficients (p Յ .10, one-tailed test) with bold text. In the profit benchmark analyses, EM it equals 1 if X Յ E it Ͻ (X ϩ 0.01) and 0 if (X Ϫ 0.01) Յ E it Ͻ X. We define E it as firm i's net income in year t (annual Compustat data item #172) divided by the market value of equity at the end of year tϪ1 (annual Compustat data item #25 ϫ #199), and X as the profit target. X equals 0 for the actual profit benchmark. In the earnings change benchmark analyses, EM it equals 1 if X Յ ⌬E it Ͻ (X ϩ 0.01) and 0 if (X Ϫ 0.01) Յ ⌬E it Ͻ X. We define ⌬E it as the change in firm i's net income from year tϪ1 to t divided by the market value of equity at the end of year tϪ2, and X as the earnings change target. X equals 0 for the actual earnings increase benchmark. In the analysts-based unexpected earnings target analyses, EM it equals 1 if UE it equals X and 0 if UE it equals X less one cent per share. We define UE it as firm i's year t actual earnings per share minus the single-most recent analyst forecast provided prior to the earnings announcement both reported from the Unadjusted I / B / E / S Detail History file. We round UE it to the nearest penny. We define X as the unexpected earnings target, and X equals 0 for the actual analysts' forecast benchmark. To calculate ROA-Matched Fwd-Look Dis. Accruals, we match firms on ROA and two-digit SIC industry (Kothari et al. 2005) . Table 1 provides the definitions for all other variables.
special items and income taxes explain the previous associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit, earnings increase, and analysts' forecast benchmarks.
AAER Analyses
We collected a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement action for overstating earnings to determine if these firms are more likely to reside in the just-beat bins around the actual earnings benchmarks. Following the method in Dechow et al. (1995 Dechow et al. ( , 1996 , we conducted a keyword search for ''Section 13(a)'' in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) Database through Lexis-Nexis. We searched for AAERs issued between 1994 and November 2004 with an identified manipulation between fiscal year 1994 and 2002 to match our sample period. We eliminated releases involving violation of auditing standards, multiple releases involving the same firms, and firms not listed on Compustat. The final sample consisted of 392 firm-years subject to enforcement actions by the SEC for overstating earnings between 1994 and 2002.
We then plotted the percentage of AAER firm-years (i.e., the violation years) in each ''bin'' of the distribution of earnings, earnings changes, and analysts-based unexpected earnings against the relative percentages for this study's sample of firms (i.e., from Panel A of Tables 1, 2 and 3). The percentage of AAER firms in the UE ϭ 0 bin for the analysts' forecast benchmark (39.7 percent) (not tabulated) is significantly higher (p ϭ .00, one-tailed binomial test) than the underlying population of firms that reside in this bin (15.0 percent). Less pronounced differences exist for the profit benchmark (i.e., 6.9 percent of AAER firms reside in the .00 Յ E it Ͻ .01. bin versus 5.2 percent for all firms, p ϭ .14, one-tailed binomial test). For the earnings increase benchmark, the percentages of AAER firms in the .00 Յ ⌬E it Ͻ .01 bin (8.8 percent) is smaller than the underlying population of firms that reside in this bin (13.0 percent). Similar to previous analyses, these results allow stronger conclusions regarding earnings management around the analysts' forecast benchmark. This evidence is also consistent with recent studies that conclude that the analysts' forecast benchmark is the most important benchmark during the sample period (Dechow et al. 2003; Brown and Caylor 2005) .
VI. CONCLUSION
This study investigates the extent to which the positive associations between alternative discretionary accrual measures and beating benchmarks are attributable to earnings management. We find that the positive associations between discretionary accrual measures and beating the profit benchmark hold for comparisons of groups segregated based on pseudo profit targets. We find similar results for pseudo targets across the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find that the positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating the analysts' forecast benchmark generally do not extend to comparisons across pseudo targets based upon analysts-based unexpected earnings. These results suggest that demonstrating positive associations between a specific discretionary accrual measure and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmark is not sufficient to conclude that the discretionary accrual actually detects earnings management. Likewise, this evidence indicates that the underlying association between firm performance and discretionary accrual measures is less problematic for tests of earnings management using analysts-based unexpected earnings.
We provide an additional analysis that specifically accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accrual measures and earnings. Implicit in studies analyzing accruals around earnings benchmarks is the expectation that the fundamental relationship
The Accounting Review, May 2006 between firm performance and discretionary accruals shifts around the earnings benchmarks. Accordingly, we test whether the associations between discretionary accrual proxies and firm performance are more pronounced around the profit benchmark. We conduct similar analyses for the actual earnings increase benchmark. Consistent with earnings management, results suggest that the association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the profit benchmark. We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. Thus, we are unable to conclude with confidence that earnings management explains the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.
One advantage of this study's analysis relative to performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005 ) is that it does not require specifying a metric to match upon (e.g., ROA)-i.e., it does not require specifying the exact nature of the correlation between discretionary accruals and performance. Relative to performance-matching this analysis may result in more powerful tests of earnings management around earnings benchmarks as it does not introduce ''noise'' in the tests via the matching process. Accordingly, this method may reduce the likelihood of falsely accepting the null hypothesis of no earnings management due to low-power tests.
This study's analyses should aid future researchers in investigating earnings management around earnings benchmarks using specific financial statement accounts (e.g., loan loss provision, valuation allowance, pension expense, etc.) or alternative abnormal accrual measures. In addition, this study's analyses should prove useful in tests for cross-temporal shifts in earnings management activity (e.g., pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley) or of other earnings management hypotheses (e.g., smoothing or big bath) that may be hindered by the systematic association between discretionary accrual proxies and performance. Finally, the pseudo target analyses may be particularly informative for studies assessing the properties of newly developed abnormal accrual measures.
This study's analyses should be interpreted in light of the following limitations. First, we assume that firms have greater incentives to manage earnings around the actual earnings benchmarks. If this assumption is not descriptive, then tests for increased associations between discretionary accruals and beating earnings benchmarks are not informative. Second, if firms manage earnings throughout the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and unexpected earnings, then tests for increased associations between discretionary accruals and beating earnings benchmarks underestimate the association between discretionary accruals and beating the actual benchmarks that is attributable to earnings management. Third, our analyses assume that the underlying association between discretionary accruals and performance (i.e., irrespective of earnings management) does not shift around the actual earnings benchmarks. If this assumption is not descriptive, then tests could be biased in favor of or against finding more pronounced associations around the actual earnings benchmarks.
